Java Code Examples for javacard.security.Key#isInitialized()
The following examples show how to use
javacard.security.Key#isInitialized() .
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Example 1
Source File: CardEdge.java From SatochipApplet with GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 | 4 votes |
/** * This function allows to reset a private ECkey stored in the card. * If 2FA is enabled, a hmac code must be provided to reset the key. * * ins: 0x33 * p1: private key number (0x00-0x0F) * p2: 0x00 * data: [ (option)HMAC-2FA(20b)] * return: none */ private short ResetKey(APDU apdu, byte[] buffer) { // check that PIN[0] has been entered previously if (!pins[0].isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_UNAUTHORIZED); if (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P2] != (byte) 0x00) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P2); byte key_nb = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P1]; if ((key_nb < 0) || (key_nb >= MAX_NUM_KEYS)) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); Key key = eckeys[key_nb]; // check type and size if ((key == null) || !key.isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); // check 2FA if required if (needs_2FA){ short bytesLeft = Util.makeShort((byte) 0x00, buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC]); if (bytesLeft < (short)20) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); // compute the corresponding partial public key... keyAgreement.init((ECPrivateKey)key); keyAgreement.generateSecret(Secp256k1.SECP256K1, Secp256k1.OFFSET_SECP256K1_G, (short) 65, tmpBuffer, (short)0); //pubkey in uncompressed form Util.arrayCopy(tmpBuffer, (short)1, recvBuffer, (short)0, (short)32); // hmac of 64-bytes msg: (pubkey-x | 32bytes (0x20^key_nb)-padding) Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(recvBuffer, (short)32, (short)32, (byte) (0x20^key_nb)); HmacSha160.computeHmacSha160(data2FA, OFFSET_2FA_HMACKEY, (short)20, recvBuffer, (short)0, (short)64, recvBuffer, (short)64); if (Util.arrayCompare(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, recvBuffer, (short)64, (short)20)!=0) ISOException.throwIt(SW_SIGNATURE_INVALID); } // clear key & reset flag key.clearKey(); eckeys_flag &= (short) ~(0x0001 << key_nb);// reset corresponding bit flag; return (short)0; }
Example 2
Source File: CardEdge.java From SatochipApplet with GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 | 4 votes |
/** * This function returns the public key associated with a particular private key stored * in the applet. The exact key blob contents depend on the key�s algorithm and type. * * ins: 0x35 * p1: private key number (0x00-0x0F) * p2: 0x00 * data: none * return(SECP256K1): [coordx_size(2b) | pubkey_coordx | sig_size(2b) | sig] */ private short getPublicKeyFromPrivate(APDU apdu, byte[] buffer) { // check that PIN[0] has been entered previously if (!pins[0].isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_UNAUTHORIZED); if (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P2] != (byte) 0x00) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P2); byte key_nb = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P1]; if ((key_nb < 0) || (key_nb >= MAX_NUM_KEYS)) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); Key key = eckeys[key_nb]; // check type and size if ((key == null) || !key.isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); if (key.getType() != KeyBuilder.TYPE_EC_FP_PRIVATE) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); if (key.getSize()!= LENGTH_EC_FP_256) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); // check the curve param if(!Secp256k1.checkCurveParameters((ECPrivateKey)key, recvBuffer, (short)0)) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); // compute the corresponding partial public key... keyAgreement.init((ECPrivateKey)key); short coordx_size=(short)32; keyAgreement.generateSecret(Secp256k1.SECP256K1, Secp256k1.OFFSET_SECP256K1_G, (short) 65, buffer, (short)1); //pubkey in uncompressed form Util.setShort(buffer, (short)0, coordx_size); // sign fixed message sigECDSA.init(key, Signature.MODE_SIGN); short sign_size= sigECDSA.sign(buffer, (short)0, (short)(coordx_size+2), buffer, (short)(coordx_size+4)); Util.setShort(buffer, (short)(coordx_size+2), sign_size); // return x-coordinate of public key+signature // the client can recover full public-key from the signature or // by guessing the compression value () and verifying the signature... return (short)(2+coordx_size+2+sign_size); }
Example 3
Source File: CardEdge.java From SatochipApplet with GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 | 4 votes |
/** * This function signs the current hash transaction with a std or the last extended key * The hash provided in the APDU is compared to the version stored inside the chip. * Depending of the total amount in the transaction and the predefined limit, * a HMAC must be provided as an additional security layer. * * ins: 0x6F * p1: key number or 0xFF for the last derived Bip32 extended key * p2: 0x00 * data: [hash(32b) | option: 2FA-flag(2b)|hmac(20b)] * * return: [sig ] * */ private short SignTransaction(APDU apdu, byte[] buffer){ // check that PIN[0] has been entered previously if (!pins[0].isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_UNAUTHORIZED); byte key_nb = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P1]; if ( (key_nb!=(byte)0xFF) && ((key_nb < 0) || (key_nb >= MAX_NUM_KEYS)) ) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); short bytesLeft = Util.makeShort((byte) 0x00, buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC]); if (bytesLeft<MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA_256) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); // check whether the seed is initialized if (key_nb==(byte)0xFF && !bip32_seeded) ISOException.throwIt(SW_BIP32_UNINITIALIZED_SEED); // check doublehash value in buffer with cached singlehash value sha256.reset(); sha256.doFinal(transactionData, OFFSET_TRANSACTION_HASH, MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA_256, recvBuffer, (short)0); if ((byte)0 != Util.arrayCompare(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, recvBuffer, (short)0, MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA_256)) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_TXHASH); // check challenge-response answer if necessary if(needs_2FA){ if( Biginteger.lessThan(data2FA, OFFSET_2FA_LIMIT, transactionData, OFFSET_TRANSACTION_AMOUNT, (short)8)){ if (bytesLeft<MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA_256+MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA+(short)2) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); // check flag for 2fa_hmac_chalresp short hmac_flags= Util.getShort(buffer, (short)(ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA+32)); if (hmac_flags!=HMAC_CHALRESP_2FA) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); // hmac of 64-bytes msg: (doublesha256(raw_tx) | 32bytes zero-padding) Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(recvBuffer, (short)32, (short)32, (byte)0x00); HmacSha160.computeHmacSha160(data2FA, OFFSET_2FA_HMACKEY, (short)20, recvBuffer, (short)0, (short)64, recvBuffer, (short)64); if (Util.arrayCompare(buffer, (short)(ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA+32+2), recvBuffer, (short)64, (short)20)!=0) ISOException.throwIt(SW_SIGNATURE_INVALID); // reset total amount Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(transactionData, OFFSET_TRANSACTION_TOTAL, (short)8, (byte)0x00); } else{ //update total amount Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(transactionData, OFFSET_TRANSACTION_AMOUNT, transactionData, OFFSET_TRANSACTION_TOTAL, (short)8); } } // hash+sign singlehash if (key_nb==(byte)0xFF) sigECDSA.init(bip32_extendedkey, Signature.MODE_SIGN); else{ Key key= eckeys[key_nb]; // check type and size if ((key == null) || !key.isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); if (key.getType() != KeyBuilder.TYPE_EC_FP_PRIVATE) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); if (key.getSize()!= LENGTH_EC_FP_256) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); sigECDSA.init(key, Signature.MODE_SIGN); } short sign_size= sigECDSA.sign(transactionData, OFFSET_TRANSACTION_HASH, (short)32, buffer, (short)0); return sign_size; }
Example 4
Source File: CardEdge.java From SatochipApplet with GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 | 4 votes |
/** * This function signs a given transaction hash with a std or the last extended key * If 2FA is enabled, a HMAC must be provided as an additional security layer. * * ins: 0x7A * p1: key number or 0xFF for the last derived Bip32 extended key * p2: 0x00 * data: [hash(32b) | option: 2FA-flag(2b)|hmac(20b)] * * return: [sig ] * */ private short SignTransactionHash(APDU apdu, byte[] buffer){ // check that PIN[0] has been entered previously if (!pins[0].isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_UNAUTHORIZED); byte key_nb = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P1]; if ( (key_nb!=(byte)0xFF) && ((key_nb < 0) || (key_nb >= MAX_NUM_KEYS)) ) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); short bytesLeft = Util.makeShort((byte) 0x00, buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC]); if (bytesLeft<MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA_256) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); // check whether the seed is initialized if (key_nb==(byte)0xFF && !bip32_seeded) ISOException.throwIt(SW_BIP32_UNINITIALIZED_SEED); // check 2FA if required if(needs_2FA){ // check data length if (bytesLeft<MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA_256+MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA+(short)2) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); // check flag for 2fa_hmac_chalresp short hmac_flags= Util.getShort(buffer, (short)(ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA+32)); if (hmac_flags!=HMAC_CHALRESP_2FA) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); // hmac of 64-bytes msg: ( 32bytes tx_hash | 32bytes 0xCC-padding) Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer, (short)ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, recvBuffer, (short)0, (short)32); Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(recvBuffer, (short)32, (short)32, (byte)0xCC); HmacSha160.computeHmacSha160(data2FA, OFFSET_2FA_HMACKEY, (short)20, recvBuffer, (short)0, (short)64, recvBuffer, (short)64); if (Util.arrayCompare(buffer, (short)(ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA+32+2), recvBuffer, (short)64, (short)20)!=0) ISOException.throwIt(SW_SIGNATURE_INVALID); } // hash+sign singlehash if (key_nb==(byte)0xFF) sigECDSA.init(bip32_extendedkey, Signature.MODE_SIGN); else{ Key key= eckeys[key_nb]; // check type and size if ((key == null) || !key.isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_P1); if (key.getType() != KeyBuilder.TYPE_EC_FP_PRIVATE) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); if (key.getSize()!= LENGTH_EC_FP_256) ISOException.throwIt(SW_INCORRECT_ALG); sigECDSA.init(key, Signature.MODE_SIGN); } short sign_size= sigECDSA.signPreComputedHash(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA_256, buffer, (short)0); return sign_size; }